### **AT: T – Financial Incentive**

#### 1) We meet –

#### Increase means they must make that number greater

Merriam-Webster 12, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase?show=0&t=1348112715

Increase:

in·crease verb \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\

intransitive verb

1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)

2: to multiply by the production of young

#### 2) Counter interpretation – Financial incentives are a disbursement of funds directly tied to an express objective – more predictable because it’s in terms of the topic

Webb**,**  – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa, 93

(“Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures. Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies. In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created. Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used. And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming, are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well. Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### 3) For implies a direct relationship

Words and Phrase 04

(Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “For,” Volume 17, p. 338-343)

 W.D.Tenn. 1942. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 uses the words “production for commerce” as denoting an intention to deal in a restricted way with question of coverage in connection with those employed directly in production of articles to be sold, shipped or transported across state lines in commerce, producing goods “for” a certain purpose implying a direct relation as distinguished from producing something which only “affects” a certain purpose which implies an indirect relation.

#### 5) Predictable ground – neg arguments about energy production will always be responsive because the incentive has to be explicitly tied to energy production

#### **6) Aff mechanism flexibility – their interpretation prevents the aff from being able to access important solvency mechanisms and forces obscure and contrived debates. Democracy assistance topic proves.**

#### Their interp is horrible – energy crisis now proves not enough energy incentives now – our interp is key to relevant debates

#### They kill aff ground – affs would already be solved

#### 7) Prefer contextual support – power purchase agreements are financial incentives for nuclear power

Carroll, Senior Vice President and General Counsel at Terra-Gen Power, 05

(January, International Power & Utilities Finance Review, New nuclear power plants in the US: Governmental incentives for non-recourse project finance)

In its report dated January 10, 2005, the NETF identified the unavailability of financing as a significant obstacle to new nuclear power plant construction. The NETF recommended that the US government offer a range of financial incentives for the construction of the first few reactors, such as: secured loans, loan guarantees, accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, production tax credits and government power purchase agreements.

### AT: Nuke Power Down

#### **\*\*Nuclear development is inevitable even under conservative estimates – most complete data**

WNN 2012 (September 26, “Nuclear growth slowing not stalling” <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Nuclear_growth_slowing_not_stalling-2609127.html>)

Growth rates may have slowed but world nuclear energy capacity will nevertheless continue to increase over the coming decades, according to the latest projections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

When IAEA director general Yukiya Amano referred to the findings of the 32nd edition of the IAEA's annually updated Reference Data Series No. 1 in his address to the agency's 56th General Conference in Vienna recently, he noted that although the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident raised "fundamental questions" on nuclear's future, the atom will remain an important option for many countries, with developing countries continuing to show a keen interest in nuclear power.

The newly released report - full title Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050 - contains high and low projections of energy, electricity and nuclear power trends over the coming years. Under the low scenario, installed nuclear capacity is predicted to grow from 2011's 370 GWe to reach 456 GWe by 2030, about 9% down on the increase projected in 2011. A ten-year delay in growth anticipated before the Fukushima accident is observed, with nuclear capacity taking until 2030 to reach levels that had previously been anticipated for 2020.

The high scenario predicts nuclear capacity reaching 740 GWe by 2040. Projected growth is strongest in the east Asia, including China and South Korea, where regional capacity is forecast to grow from 80 GWe at the end of 2011 to 153 GWe in 2030 in the low scenario and 274 GWe in the high scenario. Growth is expected in all regions of the world under the high scenario, although total Western European nuclear capacity could decline from 115 GWe in 2011 to 70 GWe in 2030 under the low scenario. The low scenario also sees a slight decrease for nuclear capacity in North America.

The figures on nuclear are based on actual statistical data collected by the IAEA, with country-by-country estimates of future nuclear capacity established by a group of experts using a 'bottom up' approach. All possible licence renewals, planned shutdowns and plausible construction projects are taken into consideration. The conservative low scenario assumes the continuation of current trends and few unexpected policy changes, although it is compatible with a potential decline in nuclear's share of Japan's electricity mix. The more optimistic high scenario assumes that current global financial and economic crises are overcome relatively soon and global policies are implemented to mitigate climate change. Both scenarios are plausible and technically feasible, the IAEA maintains.

The report recognises the on-going global financial crisis, the low price of natural gas and reduced electricity demand in some regions, in addition to responses to Fukushima, as challenges that will serve to temporarily delay the deployment of some nuclear power plants. Eighteen months on from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident there is still uncertainty about the full extent of the effects of individual policy responses to regional projections. Nevertheless, the report says, the "underlying fundamentals of population growth and demand for electricity in the developing world," coupled with concerns over climate change, energy security and price volatility for other fuels, "continue to point to nuclear generating capacity playing an important role in the energy mix in the longer term."

### AT: China

#### China is pursuing nuclear power now – US export leadership is key to Asian influence

Cullinane ‘11

[Scott Cullinane is a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=319:america-falling-behind-the-strategic-dimensions-of-chinese-commercial-nuclear-energy&catid=118:content&Itemid=376>]

Due to a confluence of events the United States has recently focused more attention on nuclear weapons policy than it has in previous years; however, the proliferation of commercial nuclear technology and its implications for America’s strategic position have been largely ignored. While the Unites States is currently a participant in the international commercial nuclear energy trade, America’s own domestic construction of nuclear power plants has atrophied severely and the US risks losing its competitive edge in the nuclear energy arena.¶ Simultaneously, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made great strides in closing the nuclear energy development gap with America. Through a combination of importing technology, research from within China itself, and a disciplined policy approach the PRC is increasingly able to leverage the export of commercial nuclear power as part of its national strategy. Disturbingly, China does not share America’s commitment to stability, transparency, and responsibility when exporting nuclear technology. This is a growing strategic weakness and risk for the United States. To remain competitive and to be in a position to offset the PRC when required the American government should encourage the domestic use of nuclear power and spur the forces of technological innovation.¶ History has recorded well American wartime nuclear developments which culminated in the July 1945 Trinity Test, but what happened near Arco, Idaho six years later has been overlooked. In 1951, scientists for the first time produced usable electricity from an experimental nuclear reactor. Once this barrier was conquered the atom was harnessed to generate electricity and permitted America to move into the field of commercial nuclear power. In the next five years alone the United States signed over 20 nuclear cooperation agreements with various countries. Not only did the US build dozens of power plants domestically during the 1960s and 1970s, the US Export-Import Bank also distributed $7.1 billion dollars in loans and guarantees for the international sale of 49 reactors. American built and designed reactors were exported around the world during those years. Even today, more than 60% of the world’s 440 operating reactors are based on technology developed in the United States. The growth of the US civilian nuclear power sector stagnated after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 – the most serious accident in American civilian nuclear power history. Three Mile Island shook America’s confidence in nuclear power and provided the anti-nuclear lobby ample fuel to oppose the further construction of any nuclear power plants. In the following decade, 42 planned domestic nuclear power plants were cancelled, and in the 30 years since the Three Mile Island incident the American nuclear power industry has survived only through foreign sales and merging operations with companies in Asia and Europe. Westinghouse sold its nuclear division to Toshiba and General Electric joined with Hitachi. Even the highest levels of the American government came to cast nuclear power aside. President Bill Clinton bragged in his 1993 State of the Union Address that “we are eliminating programs that are no longer needed, such as nuclear power research and development.” ¶ America’s slow pace of reactor construction over the past three decades has stymied innovation and caused the nuclear sector and its industrial base to shrivel. While some aspects of America’s nuclear infrastructure still operate effectively, many critical areas have atrophied. For example, one capability that America has entirely lost is the means to cast ultra heavy forgings in the range of 350,000 – 600,000 pounds, which impacts the construction of containment vessels, turbine rotors, and steam generators. In contrast, Japan, China, and Russia all possess an ultra heavy forging capacity and South Korea and India plan to build forges in this range. Likewise, the dominance America enjoyed in uranium enrichment until the 1970s is gone. The current standard centrifuge method for uranium enrichment was not invented in America and today 40% of the enriched uranium US power plants use is processed overseas and imported. Another measure of how much the US nuclear industry has shrunk is evident in the number of companies certified to handle nuclear material. In the 1980s the United States had 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 holders of N-stamp certificates (N-stamps are the international nuclear rating certificates issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers). By 2008 that number had reduced itself to 80 suppliers and 200 N-stamp holders. A recent Government Accountability Office report, which examined data from between 1994 and 2009, found the US to have a declining share of the global commercial nuclear trade. However, during that same period over 60 reactors were built worldwide. Nuclear power plants are being built in the world increasingly by non-American companies.¶ The American nuclear industry entered the 1960s in a strong position, yet over the past 30 years other countries have closed the development gap with America. The implications of this change go beyond economics or prestige to include national security. These changes would be less threatening if friendly allies were the ones moving forward with developing a nuclear export industry;however, the quick advancement of the PRC in nuclear energy changes the strategic calculus for America.¶ The shifting strategic landscape¶ While America’s nuclear industry has languished, current changes in the world’s strategic layout no longer allow America the option of maintaining the status quo without being surpassed. The drive for research, development, and scientific progress that grew out of the Cold War propelled America forward, but those priorities have long since been downgraded by the US government. The economic development of formerly impoverished countries means that the US cannot assume continued dominance by default. The rapidly industrializing PRC is seeking its own place among the major powers of the world and is vying for hegemony in Asia; nuclear power is an example of their larger efforts to marshal their scientific and economic forces as instruments of national power.¶ The rise of China is a phrase that connotes images of a backwards country getting rich off of exporting cheap goods at great social and environmental costs. Yet, this understanding of the PRC has lead many in the United States to underestimate China’s capabilities. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has undertaken a comprehensive long-term strategy to transition from a weak state that lags behind the West to a country that is a peer-competitor to the United States. Nuclear technology provides a clear example of this. ¶ In 1978, General Secretary Deng Xiaoping began to move China out of the destructive Mao era with his policies of 'reform and opening.' As part of these changes during the 1980s, the CPC began a concerted and ongoing effort to modernize the PRC and acquire advanced technology including nuclear technology from abroad. This effort was named Program 863 and included both legal methods and espionage. By doing this, the PRC has managed to rapidly catch up to the West on some fronts. In order to eventually surpass the West in scientific development the PRC launched the follow-on Program 973 to build the foundations of basic scientific research within China to meet the nation’s major strategic needs. These steps have brought China to the cusp of the next stage of technological development, a stage known as “indigenous innovation.”¶ ¶ In 2006 the PRC published their science and technology plan out to 2020 and defined indigenous innovation as enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and absorption of imported technology in order improve national innovation capability. The Chinese seek to internalize and understand technological developments from around the world so that they can copy the equipment and use it as a point to build off in their own research. This is a step beyond merely copying and reverse engineering a piece of technology. The PRC sees this process of absorbing foreign technology coupled with indigenous innovation as a way of leapfrogging forward in development to gain the upper hand over the West. The PRC’s official statement on energy policy lists nuclear power as one of their target fields. When viewed within this context, the full range of implications from China’s development of nuclear technology becomes evident. The PRC is now competing with the United States in the areas of innovation and high-technology, two fields that have driven American power since World War Two. China’s economic appeal is no longer merely the fact that it has cheap labor, but is expanding its economic power in a purposeful way that directly challenges America’s position in the world.¶ ¶ The CPC uses the market to their advantage to attract nuclear technology and intellectual capital to China. The PRC has incentivized the process and encouraged new domestic nuclear power plant construction with the goal of having 20 nuclear power plants operational by 2020. The Chinese Ministry of Electrical Power has described PRC policy to reach this goal as encouraging joint investment between State Owned Corporations and foreign companies. 13 reactors are already operating in China, 25 more are under construction and even more reactors are in the planning stages. ¶ In line with this economic policy, China has bought nuclear reactors from Westinghouse and Areva and is cooperating with a Russian company to build nuclear power plants in Taiwan. By stipulating that Chinese companies and personnel be involved in the construction process, China is building up its own domestic capabilities and expects to become self-sufficient. China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation has partnered with Westinghouse to build a new and larger reactor based on the existing Westinghouse AP 1000 reactor. This will give the PRC a reactor design of its own to then export. If the CPC is able to combine their control over raw materials, growing technical know-how, and manufacturing base, China will not only be a powerful economy, but be able to leverage this power to service its foreign policy goals as well.¶ Even though the PRC is still working to master third generation technology, their scientists are already working on what they think will be the nuclear reactor of the future. China is developing Fourth Generation Fast Neutron Reactors and wants to have one operational by 2030. Additionally, a Chinese nuclear development company has announced its intentions to build the “world’s first high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor” in Shandong province which offers to possibility of a reactor that is nearly meltdown proof. A design, which if proved successful, could potentially redefine the commercial nuclear energy trade.¶ The risk to America¶ The international trade of nuclear material is hazardous in that every sale and transfer increases the chances for an accident or for willful misuse of the material. Nuclear commerce must be kept safe in order for the benefits of nuclear power generation to be realized. Yet, China has a record of sharing dangerous weapons and nuclear material with unfit countries. It is a risk for America to allow China to become a nuclear exporting country with a competitive technical and scientific edge. In order to limit Chinese influence and the relative attractiveness of what they can offer, America must ensure its continuing and substantive lead in reactor technology.¶ ¶ The PRC’s record of exporting risky items is well documented. It is known that during the 1980s the Chinese shared nuclear weapon designs with Pakistan and continues to proliferate WMD-related material. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to Congress, China sells technologies and components in the Middle East and South Asia that are dual use and could support WMD and missile programs. Jane’s Intelligence Review reported in 2006 that China,¶ Despite a 1997 promise to Washington to halt its nuclear technology sales to Iran, such assistance is likely to continue. In 2005, Iranian resistance groups accused China of selling Iran beryllium, which is useful for making nuclear triggers and maraging steel (twice as hard as stainless steel), which is critical for fabricating centrifuges needed to reprocess uranium into bomb-grade material. ¶ China sells dangerous materials in order to secure its geopolitical objectives, regardless if those actions harm world stability. There is little reason to believe China will treat the sale of nuclear reactors any differently. Even if the PRC provides public assurances that it will behave differently in the future, the CPC has not been truthful for decades about its nuclear material and weapons sales and hence lacks credibility. For example, in 1983 Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng said that China does not encourage or support nuclear proliferation. In fact, it was that same year that China contracted with Algeria, then a non-NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] state, to construct a large, unsafeguarded plutonium production reactor. In 1991 a Chinese Embassy official wrote in a letter to the The Washington Post that 'China has struck no nuclear deal with Iran.' In reality, China had provided Iran with a research reactor capable of producing plutonium and a calutron, a technology that can be used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade. It has been reported that even after United Nation sanctions were put on Iran, Chinese companies were discovered selling “high-quality carbon fiber” and “pressure gauges” to Iran for use in improving their centrifuges.¶ In 2004 the PRC joined the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG), gaining international recognition of their growing power in the nuclear field. In spite of this opportunity for China to demonstrate its responsibility with nuclear energy, it has not fulfilled it NSG obligations. The PRC has kept the terms of its nuclear reactor sale to Pakistan secret and used a questionable legal technicality to justify forgoing obtaining a NSG waiver for the deal. Additionally, China chose to forgo incorporating new safety measures into the reactors in order to avoid possible complications.¶ A further consequence of China exporting reactors is that these countries may wish to control the fuel cycle which provides the uranium to power their new reactors. The spread of fuel cycle technology comes with two risks: enrichment and reprocessing. Uranium can be enriched to between 3% and 5% for reactor use, but the process can be modified to produce 90% enriched uranium which is weapons-grade. Even if a country only produces low enriched uranium they could easily begin enriching at a higher level if they so choose. Every new country that nuclear technology or information is spread to exponentially increases the risk of material being stolen, given to a third party or being used as the launching point for a weapons program. China’s history of proliferation and willingness to engage economically with very unsavory governments seems likely to increase the risks involving nuclear material.

#### US leadership in Asia solves escalating war

Goh 8

(Evelyn, Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Univ of Oxford, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database)

This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5 Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia’s evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the intertwining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States’ global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order 373lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

### AT: SMRs Slow

#### Takes 24 months to build

Rosner & Goldberg, Physics Prof @ U Chicago, ’11

[Robert Rosner, William E. Wrather, Distinguished Service Professor, Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics, and Physics at The University of Chicago, Director, Energy Policy Institute, Harris School of Public Policy, Stephen Goldberg, Professor of Law Emeritus at Northwestern Law, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.,” Energy Policy Institute at The University of Chicago, November 2011]

SMRs could potentially mitigate such a risk in several ways. First, SMRs have lower precompletion risk due to shorter construction schedules (24-36 months as compared with 48 months). Second, because of their smaller size, SMRs have lower market risk because there is significantly less power than needs to be sold as compared with GW-level plants. Finally, the modular nature of SMRs affords the flexibility to build capacity on an as-needded basis. In the case of unsubsidized financing, particularly relevant to merchant markets, utility decision makers that have significant aversion to risk of future natural gas spikes (i.e., gas prices rising to about $7/Mcf or one standard deviation above the recent average behavior of natural gas prices) would possibly view alternatives to gas-fired generation as attractive options, particularly if the investment requirements are comparable – SMRs could potentially “fit the bill.”

### AT: DOE

#### Current DOE funding non-uniques the DA but doesn’t solve

Westenhaus, Editor of New Energy & Fuel, ’12

[Brian Westenhaus, Editor of New Energy and Fuel, “A Government Divided Against Itself Is a Mess,” January 27th 2012, http://newenergyandfuel.com/http:/newenergyandfuel/com/2012/01/27/a-government-divided-against-itself-is-a-mess/]

World Nuclear News is reporting that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is to help push forward the manufacture of small modular nuclear reactors. This contrasts with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) standing record of never approving a new reactor design. The December 2011 “approval” by the NRC of the Westinghouse AP1000 is not a new reactor at all; rather it’s a next generation design of existing technology. Clearly U.S. Federal government is working at cross-purposes. A fine, expensive and consumer and industrial damaging mess is sure to ensue. The DOE has new cost-sharing arrangements with private industry to support design and licensing activities. With considerable astonishment, taxpayers are going to be funding one agency to pay the fees of another. Make that Astounded. The good news, aside from the circumstances is the DOE intends ultimately to fund up to two designs for small modular reactors (SMR) through a cost-shared partnership, which will support first-of-a-kind engineering, design certification and licensing. The draft Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) is now out to solicit input from the industry for preparing a full FOA that’s aiming at a reactor deployment date about 2022. The DOE’s FOA seeks applications for two grants, estimated to total $452 million over five years. The funding anticipates paying up to half the cost of developing and deploying perhaps two small modular reactor designs. The tooth gnashing fact is that’s not going to be enough money and it leaves all but the chosen one or two designs at a major disadvantage. This after the Solyndra debacle and others has thoughtful observers realizing that bureaucrats are picking the winners before the competition starts. That is a terrible policy; a huge waste of resources and the best design is sure to be left out when historic experience is considered. It will be a lobbyist’s game any moment now. At issue are small, compact reactors of around 300 MWe and lower in capacity, a third or less of the size of the typical commercial nuclear power plant built so far. These kinds of plants could potentially offer a range of features in terms of safety, construction and siting as well as potential economic benefits. But if only one or two are chosen the circumstances for users will be limited or force excess costs to make a mandated choice instead of an optimal one for the situation. At this size reactors are modular or have a ‘plug and play’ nature, which means they could be made in factories and transported to generation sites. That manufacturing approach over a custom build method offers economies of scale reducing both capital costs and construction times. The small size could make them suitable for small electric grids and markets that cannot support large reactors costs, production or regulatory expense. Bravely, US Energy Secretary Steven Chu described the funding as a “significant step” in designing, manufacturing, and exporting small modular reactors. It takes courage to come out with what is obviously a poorly thought out policy. Yet, the bravery may be driven by the Congress abandoning its responsibility to organize the law in a fashion that resembles common sense. Chu is bright enough and has enough outside the beltway experience to understand and say, “America’s choice is clear – we can either develop the next generation of clean energy technologies, which will help create thousands of new jobs and export opportunities here in America, or we can wait for other countries to take the lead.” Meanwhile – the NRC remains embroiled in a managerial mess. The commissioners and the Chairman are still at odds, and the oversight of the media has disappeared, the Congress along with it. There is no reasonable expectation anything of consequence is going to happen any time soon, and it’s an election year as well. There is a lot at stake if such a plan proceeds. Westinghouse is developing its own 200 MWe SMR, and the information has escaped that Westinghouse’s approved AP1000 nuclear reactor design was supported through a cost-shared agreement with DOE. This information leads one to suspect that Westinghouse may be looking for a quick taxpayer funded catch up. There is a long list of technologies with potential. (See Brian Wang’s page at NextBigFuture.) NuScale Power Inc’s 45 MWe NuScale reactor and Babcock & Wilcox’s 160 MWe mPower should both be eligible, too. The NRC is currently involved in pre-application activities on both designs in anticipation of a design certification application for the NuScale reactor in the first months of 2012, followed by one for the mPower design towards the end of 2013. These one should think, are the leaders. The list of good ideas out there is grand, covering three major technologies. The light water reactors list includes Babcock & Wilcox, NuScale Power Inc., Westinghouse and Holtec’s Inherently Safe Modular Underground Reactor at 140 MWe. The high temperature gas-cooled reactors are coming from AREVA’s Antares, General Atomics model called Gas Turbine Modular Helium Reactor and Pebble Bed Modular Reactor Ltd.’s reactor named conveniently, the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor. The liquid metal cooled and fast reactor list is equally impressive. Here are GE Hitachi’s Nuclear Power Reactor Innovative Small Module, Hyperion Power Generation’s Hyperion Power Module and Toshiba’s – Toshiba 4S for Super Small, Safe and Simple. That’s 10, add in a couple of thorium fueled ones and that would be a dozen. The Feds expect to give one or two 40% of a billion dollars head start. How is that going to work out for the country? Wouldn’t it be better to just completely revamp the NRC? Admittedly the DOE must be under stress from the machinations over at the NRC. And from a government mind, that plan might seem great. For the rest of us it looks like a waste from the start and a market distortion for decades, perhaps centuries to come.

### AT: No Blackouts/Weather (Carded)

#### Blackouts from weather are likely – climate change and grid vulnerabilities

Montgomery et al. 2012 (August 25, Jeff, DAN D’AMBROSIO AND MICHAEL RISINIT “Storms, heat repeatedly test U.S. power grid” <http://www.lohud.com/article/20120826/NEWS05/308260032?nclick_check=1>)

Extreme weather is putting America’s power grid to the test, with a year-long run of violent storms and record heat battering a system built for fairer skies. Winter storms, heat waves, tropical storms, an October snowstorm and late June’s “super derecho” — a thunderstorm with straight-line winds that snapped electrical transmission towers and power poles from the Midwest through the Mid-Atlantic — have forced global warming and electric supply vulnerability to the top of an already-daunting list of blackout triggers. Energy officials are acknowledging climate change as a force that finally has to be reckoned with, even as concern grows over other threats — ranging from computer-hacking cyberterrorists to utility mistakes to plain bad luck — that can set off catastrophic blackouts. A major blackout in hyper-wired America would have crippling consequences, with some experts predicting economic losses up to $180 billion. “This is really the fundamental linchpin for everything in our society, our economy, our quality of life,” said Massoud Amin, a University of Minnesota professor and longtime electric industry analyst and consultant. “By deferring infrastructure upgrades, we are basically increasing the risk for the whole system.” America’s grid is a diverse amalgamation of hydroelectric dams, nuclear power plants, coal-fired plants, windmills and solar panels feeding electricity into more than 200,000 miles of high voltage wire and more than 1 million miles of local and regional distribution lines. Ten regional grid operators — such as PJM, New York ISO and New England ISO — control the continuous flow of electricity, some of it suspended from aging towers and poles. The grid operators manage 5,800 electric utilities, which pump juice into the system from more than 15,000 generating units. But a patchwork of regulations leave the operators unable to fully control utilities in their region. Last year, the American Society of Civil Engineers predicted a $107 billion shortfall in national electric system investment by 2020. One industry group reported, “A recent study by the owners of New York’s transmission facilities found that nearly 4,700 circuit-miles of the state’s 11,000 circuit-miles of transmission lines will require replacement within the next 30 years, at an estimated cost of $25 billion.” At the same time, Terry Boston, president of the PJM bulk electricity management grid that serves 60 million residents in parts of 13 states in the East and Midwest, said doubts are growing over forecasts based on long-term weather trends, typically 30-year averages. PJM experts, he said, could soon factor climate change and extreme events into their planning models for delivering power — and for restoring it when big storms turn off the lights.

### AT Military T/O DA

#### No link – PPA’s don’t spend money up front

**DOE, ’11**

[“Funding Federal Energy and Water Projects”, July, <http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/52085.pdf>]

On-site renewable PPAs allow Federal agencies to fund on-site renewable energy projects with no upfront capital costs incurred. A developer installs a renewable energy system on agency property under an agreement that the agency will purchase the power generated by the system. The agency pays for the system through these power purchase payments over the life of the contract. After installation, the developer owns, operates, and maintains the system for the life of the contract. The PPA price is typically determined through a competitive procurement process.

#### The plan doesn’t procure any SMR’s it only buys power from them in a 30 year contract – that’s nowhere near the cost of current energy programs

#### Massive military spending now to get power from renewables

Forbes 12

(2/19, U.S. Defense Contractors Are Hidden Investment Plays in Renewable Energy Initiatives, www.forbes.com/sites/genemarcial/2012/02/19/u-s-defense-contractors-are-hidden-investment-plays-in-renewable-energy-initiatives/

The Defense Department spends some $20 billion a year on energy, using about 300,000 barrels of oil a day, according to the Pew Project on National Security, Energy and Climate Control. And military spending on renewable energy rose 300% between 2006 and 2009, to $1.2 billion, notes Pew, and should exceed $10 billion per year by 2030.

#### Aff trades off

GAO 2012

(April, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT FINANCING

Improved Guidance and Information Sharing Needed for DOD Project-Level Officials, Report to Congressional Committees)

Availability of funding. Some military service headquarters and installation officials said that, in recent years, they have preferred to use up-front appropriations to pay for renewable energy projects on installations since an increased amount of appropriated funding has been available for such projects through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Energy Conservation Investment Program, and centrally managed operation and maintenance funding from the military services. However, officials said that they expect they will need to seek alternative financing for renewable energy projects in the future due to likely reductions in the availability of up-front appropriated funding. Some officials noted that a drawback of each of the appropriated fund sources is that renewable energy projects must compete with other projects for funding and renewable energy projects are often a lower priority than other projects because of the relatively higher cost and lower savings generated from such projects. For example, officials at some installations said that they generally do not use installation-managed operation and maintenance funds for renewable energy projects because of competing demands for this funding for repairs and other maintenance of existing facilities on the installation. With regard to the Energy Conservation Investment Program, renewable energy projects must compete against other renewable energy projects as well as energy efficiency projects for limited funding and, according to officials, energy efficiency projects are often more cost-effective than renewable energy projects and receive higher priority for funding.

#### Buying power from SMR’s will cost less

Rosner and Goldberg, Professor of Physics at U Chicago and Assistant to the Director at the Argonne National Laboratory, 11

(Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S., https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf)

President Obama has sought to place federal agencies in the vanguard of efforts to adopt clean energy technologies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Executive Order 13514, issued on October 5, 2009, calls for reductions in greenhouse gases by all federal agencies, with DOE establishing a target of a 28% reduction by 2020, including greenhouse gases associated with purchased electricity. SMRs provide one potential option to meet the President’s Executive Order. One or more federal agency facilities that can be cost effectively connected to an SMR plant could agree to contract to purchase the bulk of the power output from a privately developed and financed LEAD plant.A LEAD plant, even without the benefits of learning, could offer electricity to federal facilities at prices competitive with the unsubsidized significant cost of other clean energy technologies. Table 4 shows that the LCOE estimates for the LEAD and FOAK-1plants are in the range of the unsubsidized national LCOE estimates for other clean electricity generation technologies (based on the current state of maturity of the other technologies). All of these technologies should experience additional learning improvements over time. However, as presented earlier in the learning model analysis, the study team anticipates significantly greater learning improvements in SMR technology that would improve the competitive position of SMRs over time. Additional competitive market opportunities can be identified on a region-specific, technology-specific basis. For example, the Southeast U.S. has limited wind resources. While the region has abundant biomass resources, the estimated unsubsidized cost of biomass electricity is in the range of $90-130 per MWh (9-13¢/kWh), making LEAD and FOAK plants very competitive (prior to consideration of subsidies).

### AT Defense Cuts (Georgetown)

#### No impact to sequestration

Singer, Defense Director @ Brookings, 9-23 --- Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings (9/23/2012, Peter W., “Sequestration and What it Might Mean for American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/09/23-sequestration-defense-singer)

Part V: Conclusions: Sequestration would be Stupid, but the Sky is not Falling

There is an immense amount of concern over sequestration, not just inside DC, but also among our allies. Fortunately, for them and for US security, the rhetoric does not match the reality.By looking at the actual numbers in their context and even in a few worst case scenarios, we can see that the “gap between the U.S. military and our closest rivals” will not “collapse.” [32] The gap will close, which should worry us, but these rivals still have a long way to go. Nor will cuts “destroy” the US military upon which our allies’ security also depends. As Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations captured so well, “It is implausible that the entire U.S. military would be unable to function with just under $500 billion.”[33] Indeed, far from being in a situation of “utter failure,” the US forces available globally as well as in East Asia might be lessened, but would still be quite potent. And finally, it is hard to square how sequestration would “invite aggression.” A weaker US force would be available to deter and fight foes, but by no means fundamentally changed. Indeed, such a “paper tiger” would actually be supported by spending levels equivalent to the 2007 US military budget.

### Safety Add-On

#### Domestic nuclear industry key to prevent global accidents

Wallace and Williams, Senior Adviser on U.S. Nuclear Energy Project at CSIS and Nuclear Policy Analyst at Partnership for Global Security, 12

(Nuclear Energy in America:Preventing its Early Demise, csis.org/files/publication/120417\_gf\_wallace\_williams.pdf)

Second, setting global norms and standards for safety, security, operations, and emergency response. As the world learned with past nuclear accidents and more recently with Fukushima, a major accident anywhere can have lasting repercussions everywhere. As with nonproliferation and security, America’s ability to exert leadership and influence in this area is directly linked to the strength of our domestic industry and our active involvement in the global nuclear enterprise. A strong domestic civilian industry and regulatory structure have immediate national security significance in that they help support the nuclear capabilities of the U.S. Navy, national laboratories, weapons complex, and research institutions. Third, in the past, the U.S. government could exert influence by striking export agreements with countries whose regulatory and legal frameworks reflected and were consistent with our own nonproliferation standards and commitments. At the same time, our nation set the global standard for effective, independent safety regulation (in the form of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), led international efforts to reduce proliferation risks (through the 1970 NPT Treaty and other initiatives), and provided a model for industry self-regulation. The results were not perfect, but America’s institutional support for global nonproliferation goals and the regulatory behaviors it modeled clearly helped shape the way nuclear technology was adopted and used elsewhere around the world. This influence seems certain to wane if the United States is no longer a major supplier or user of nuclear technology. With existing nonproliferation and safety and security regimes looking increasingly inadequate in this rapidly changing global nuclear landscape, American leadership and leverage is more important and more central to our national security interests than ever. To maintain its leadership role in the development, design, and operation of a growing global nuclear energy infrastructure, the next administration, whether Democrat or Republican, must recognize the invaluable role played by the commercial U.S. nuclear industry and take action to prevent its early demise.

### Energy Security 2AC

#### Absent these questions shifts in knowledge production are useless – governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking – that’s true regardless of this debate

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### **That’s most ethical – failure of preventative action and predictions drives structural violence and inequality, only actions that act to preserve future generations can resolve power relations**

Kurasawa‘4,

(Fuyuki, Assistant Prof. of Sociology @ York University, Cautionary Tales, Constellations Vol. 11, No. 4, Blackwell Synergy)

In the previous section, I described how the capacity to produce, disseminate, and receive warning signals regarding disasters on the world stage has developed in global civil society. Yet the fact remains that audiences may let a recklessness or insouciance toward the future prevail, instead of listening to and acting upon such warnings. There is no doubt that the short-sightedness and presentism are strong dynamics in contemporary society, which is enveloped by a “temporal myopia” that encourages most individuals to live in a state of chronological self-referentiality whereby they screen out anything that is not of the moment.22 The commercial media, advertising, and entertainment industries are major contributors to this “tyranny of real time”23 that feeds a societal addiction to the ‘live’ and the immediate while eroding the principle of farsightedness. The infamous quip attributed to Madame de Pompadour, ‘après nous, le déluge,’ perfectly captures a sense of utter callousness about the future that represents one of presentism’s most acute manifestations. Two closely related notions underlie it: the belief that we should only concern ourselves with whether our actions, or lack thereof, have deleterious consequences visible to us in the short-to medium-term (temporally limited responsibility); and sheer indifference toward the plight of those who will come after us (generational self-centeredness). Substantively, the two are not much different because they shift the costs and risks of present-day decisions onto our descendants. “The crisis of the future is a measure of the deficiency of our societies, incapable as they are of assessing what is involved in relationships with others,” Bindé writes. “This temporal myopia brings into play the same processes of denial of others as social shortsightedness. The absence of solidarity in time between generations merely reproduces selfishness in space within the same generation.”24 Thus, to the NIMBY (‘not-in-my-back-yard’) politics of the last few decades can be added the ‘not-in-my-lifetime’ or ‘not-to-my-children’ lines of reasoning. For members of dominant groups in the North Atlantic region, disasters are something for others to worry about – that is, those who are socio-economically marginal, or geographically and temporally distant. The variations on these themes are numerous. One is the oft-stated belief that prevention is a luxury that we can scarcely afford, or even an unwarranted conceit. Accordingly, by minimizing the urgency or gravity of potential threats, procrastination appears legitimate. Why squander time, energy, and resources to anticipate and thwart what are, after all, only hypothetical dangers? Why act today when, in any case, others will do so in the future? Why not limit ourselves to reacting to cataclysms if and when they occur? A ‘bad faith’ version of this argument goes even further by seeking to discredit, reject, or deny evidence pointing to upcoming catastrophes. Here, we enter into the domain of deliberate negligence and “culpable ignorance,”25 as manifest in the apathy of US Republican administrations toward climate change or the Clinton White House’s disengenuous and belated responses to the genocides in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. At another level, instrumental-strategic forms of thought and action, so pervasive in modern societies because institutionally entrenched in the state and the market, are rarely compatible with the demands of farsightedness. The calculation of the most technically efficient means to attain a particular bureaucratic or corporate objective, and the subsequent relentless pursuit of it, intrinsically exclude broader questions of long-term prospects or negative side-effects. What matters is the maximization of profits or national self-interest with the least effort, and as rapidly as possible. Growing risks and perils are transferred to future generations through a series of trade-offs: economic growth versus environmental protection, innovation versus safety, instant gratification versus future well-being. What can be done in the face of short-sightedness? Cosmopolitanism provides some of the clues to an answer, thanks to its formulation of a universal duty of care for humankind that transcends all geographical and socio-cultural borders. I want to expand the notion of cosmopolitan universalism in a temporal direction, so that it can become applicable to future generations and thereby nourish a vibrant culture of prevention. Consequently, we need to begin thinking about a farsighted cosmopolitanism, a chrono-cosmopolitics that takes seriously a sense ¶ of “intergenerational solidarity” toward human beings who will live in our wake as much as those living amidst us today.26 But for a farsighted cosmopolitanism to take root in global civil society, the latter must adopt a thicker regulative principle of care for the future than the one currently in vogue (which amounts to little more than an afterthought of the non-descript ‘don’t forget later generations’ ilk). Hans Jonas’s “imperative of responsibility” is valuable precisely because it prescribes an ethico-political relationship to the future consonant with the work of farsightedness.27 Fully appreciating Jonas’s position requires that we grasp the rupture it establishes with the presentist assumptions imbedded in the intentionalist tradition of Western ethics. In brief, intentionalism can be explained by reference to its best-known formulation, the Kantian categorical imperative, according to which the moral worth of a deed depends upon whether the a priori “principle of the will” or “volition” of the person performing it – that is, his or her intention – should become a universal law.28 Ex post facto evaluation of an act’s outcomes, and of whether they correspond to the initial intention, is peripheral to moral judgment. A variant of this logic is found in Weber’s discussion of the “ethic of absolute ends,” the “passionate devotion to a cause” elevating the realization of a vision of the world above all other considerations; conviction without the restraint of caution and prudence is intensely presentist.29 By contrast, Jonas’s strong consequentialism takes a cue from Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which stipulates that we must carefully ponder the potential impacts of our actions and assume responsibility for them – even for the incidence of unexpected and unintended results. Neither the contingency of outcomes nor the retrospective nature of certain moral judgments exempts an act from normative evaluation. On the contrary, consequentialism reconnects what intentionalism prefers to keep distinct: the moral worth of ends partly depends upon the means selected to attain them (and vice versa), while the correspondence between intentions and results is crucial. At the same time, Jonas goes further than Weber in breaking with presentism by advocating an “ethic of long-range responsibility” that refuses to accept the future’s indeterminacy, gesturing instead toward a practice of farsighted preparation for crises that could occur.30 From a consequentialist perspective, then, intergenerational solidarity would consist of striving to prevent our endeavors from causing large-scale human suffering and damage to the natural world over time. Jonas reformulates the categorical imperative along these lines: “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”31 What we find here, I would hold, is a substantive and future-oriented ethos on the basis of which civic associations can enact the work of preventive foresight.

#### Even if security and risk calculation are flawed, engaging in them creates discourse of social welfare and promotes a democratic civic culture that checks political exclusion and loss of value to life

Loader – Criminology Prof at Oxford – 7

(Civilizing Security, Pg. 5)

Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting events simply come as they will, or else seek refuge in the consolations offered by the total critique of securitization practices – a path that some critical scholars in criminology and security studies have found all too seductive (e.g. Bigo 2002, 2006; Walters 2003). Or one can, as we have done, supplement social criticism with the hard, uphill, necessarily painstaking work of seeking to specify what it may mean for citizens to live together securely with risk; to think about the social and political arrangements capable of making this possibility more rather than less likely, and to do what one can to nurture practices of collective security shaped not by fugitive market power or by the unfettered actors of (un)civil society, but by an inclusive, democratic politics. Social analysts of crime and security have become highly attuned to, and warned repeatedly of, the illiberal, exclusionary effects of the association between security and political community (Dillon 1996; Hughes 2007). They have not, it should be said, done so without cause, for reasons we set out at some length as the book unfolds. But this sharp sensitivity to the risks of thinking about security through a communitarian lens has itself come at a price, namely, that of failing to address and theorize fully the virtues and social benefits that can flow from members of a political community being able to put and pursue security in common. This, it seems to us, is a failure to heed the implications of the stake that all citizens have in security; to appreciate the closer alignment of self-interest and altruism that can attend the acknowledgement that we are forced to live, as Kant put it, inescapably side-by-side and that individuals simultaneously constitute and threaten one another’s security; and to register the security-enhancing significance and value of the affective bonds of trust and abstract solidarity that political communities depend upon, express and sustain. All this, we think, offers reasons to believe that security offers a conduit, perhaps the best conduit there is, for giving practical meaning to the idea of the public good, for reinventing social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all.

#### Economic rationality is ethical and solves war – self-interest motivates individuals to sacrifice some autonomy to produce security and protect the rights of others

Aasland ‘9

(Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, Ethics and Economy: After Levinas, pgs. 65-66)

Business ethics, in the sense of ethics *for* business, illustrates this: its perspective is that of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ where the constraints that are put on the individual, thanks to the ability to see the unfortunate consequences for oneself, postpone the ‘war’, in a direct or metaphoric sense of the word (*ibid.*: 70-71). This enlightened self-interest forms the base not only of the market economy, but also of a social organization and manifestation of human rights, and even of some ethical theories. It is a calculated and voluntary renunciation of one’s own freedom in order to obtain in return security and other common goals (*ibid.*: 72). The fact that economic, political and legal theories appeal to enlightened self-interest does not imply, however, that we should discard them. Nor should we reject proclamations of human rights, legal constraints of individual freedom and, for that matter, business ethics, even if they are based on an enlightened self-interest. It is rather the opposite: such institutions and knowledge are indispensable because the primary quality of the enlightened self-interest is that it restricts egocentricity. Our *practical reason* (which was Kant’s words for the reason that governs our acts, where the moral law is embedded as a principle) includes the knowledge that it can be rational to lay certain restrictions on individual freedom. In this way practical reason may postpone (for an indefinite time) violence and murder among people. This has primarily been the raison-d’être of politics and the state, but it is today taken over more and more by corporate organizations, as expressed in the new term for business ethics, as *corporate social responsibility* and *corporate citizenship* (see chapter 2). Thanks to this ‘postponement of violence’ provided by politics and economic rationality, people may unfold their freedom within the laws and regulations set up by society (Burggraeve, 2003: 77).

### AT: Solar CP

#### Microgrids fail – failure of renewables during power outage

Sater 2011 - Research Fellow at Global Green USA’s Security and Sustainability Office in Washington, DC (August, Daniel, “Military Energy Security: Current Efforts and Future Solutions” http://globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf)

Microgrids are not without their drawbacks. Similar to the problems with the departing load charge utilities levy on installations that produce renewable energy, many utilities try to restrict the use of renewable energy generation as backup power during a power outage. The utilities’ reasoning is that, if there was any electricity in the grid during an outage, their workers would be at risk while repairing any damage. According to the GAO, four out of five installations it visited could not use their renewable energy during a power outage due to utility worker safety concerns. However, one of the bases was able to negotiate a contract to allow the installation’s solar array to provide power to the critical loads of the base during a power outage. 70 For an installation to fully benefit from the installation of a microgrid, the base must first negotiate with the utility to allow for renewable energy sources to remain in use during a power outage. The ability of a microgrid to island an installation from the civilian grid should nullify any danger to utility workers as they perform any maintenance work.